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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONVERGENCE AND MORAL RELATIVISM 
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript type: Conceptual 
Research question / issue: This paper frames the debate on corporate governance 
convergence in terms of the morality underlying corporate governance models. The claims 
and arguments of moral relativism are presented to provide theoretical structure to the moral 
aspects of corporate governance convergence, and ultimately the normative question of 
whether convergence should occur. 
Research findings / insights: The morality underlying different models of corporate 
governance has largely been ignored in the corporate governance convergence literature. A 
range of moral philosophies and principles that underlie the dominant corporate governance 
models are identified. This leads to a consideration of the claims and arguments of moral 
relativism relating to corporate governance. A research agenda around the claims of 
Descriptive and Metaethical moral relativism, and which ultimately informs the associated 
normative argument, is then suggested. 
Theoretical / Academic implications: The application of moral relativism to the debate on 
corporate governance convergence presents a theoretical structure to the analysis and 
consideration of its moral aspects. This structure lends itself to further research, both 
empirical and conceptual. 
Practitioner / Policy implications: The claims and arguments of moral relativism provide a 
means of analysing calls that are made for a culturally or nationally ‘appropriate’ model of 
corporate governance. This can assist in providing direction for corporate governance reforms 
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and is of particular relevance for developing countries which have inherited Western 
corporate governance models through colonialism. 
Keywords: Anglo-American, comparative, Continental European, convergence, corporate 
governance, ethics, morality, relativism. 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONVERGENCE AND MORAL RELATIVISM 
Whether implicit or explicit, much of what is discussed in corporate governance has a 
moral aspect. This can be seen both directly and indirectly in issues such as Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), reforms to increase transparency and accountability, the prevention of 
fraud, the discussions of directors’ responsibilities, the rights of shareholders and 
stakeholders, and ultimately the fundamental questions concerning to whom corporations 
have obligations and for whose benefit they function.  While many of these issues have been 
identified and discussed elsewhere, the moral aspects of corporate governance convergence 
have not yet been addressed directly. This paper specifically considers the moral aspects of 
corporate governance convergence, through the lens of moral relativism, being that aspect of 
moral philosophy in which differences in moral judgements and the existence of absolute or 
universal moral truths are considered.  
Corporate governance convergence refers to the trend of corporate governance models, 
typically at a national or supranational level, to merge in their practices and theoretical 
perspectives. Complete convergence implies that national differences would disappear and 
ultimately a universal corporate governance model would be adopted. Clarke (2004, 205) 
believes that the “greatest contemporary theoretical and policy debates in corporate 
governance are whether there is global convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon market-based 
outsider model of corporate governance” (emphasis in original). This descriptive question 
(whether towards an ‘Anglo-Saxon’, ‘outsider’, or some other model) is clearly of 
importance. However the normative question of whether such convergence should occur 
remains unanswered, and is often not raised.  
The purpose of this paper is to consider how the claims and arguments of moral 
relativism can inform this normative question of whether corporate governance convergence 
should occur. This is achieved by identifying the morality implicit in the dominant (and well-
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known) corporate governance models and by applying the claims and arguments of moral 
relativism to corporate governance convergence. These claims and arguments then provide 
theoretical structure to the normative question of whether or not corporate governance 
convergence should occur.  It should be noted that the purpose of the paper is not to argue for 
either convergence or diversity, or for the dominance of any particular model, but rather to 
examine how moral relativism can inform the existing debate. Consequently, an objective, 
analytical stance is adopted as far as possible, without supporting or denigrating any existing 
model or jurisdiction. 
The paper proceeds with a brief review of the corporate governance convergence 
literature, drawing attention to alternative perspectives that emphasise the social and cultural 
factors that underlie corporate governance models. Against this background, consideration of 
the moral aspects of corporate governance (currently absent) is both necessary and relevant. 
The second section identifies a range of moral principles and philosophies that can justify, 
firstly, the Anglo-American, and, secondly, the Continental European and Japanese models. 
The paper is concerned with the morality that underlies corporate governance systems, rather 
than with more explicit aspects of corporate governance, such as CSR, fraud and oversight 
mechanisms1. This is followed by a section presenting the claims and arguments of moral 
relativism, applying these to corporate governance convergence, and addressing the common 
criticisms of moral relativism. The last section presents an agenda for further research.  
It should be noted that although different moral principles may be used to explain 
different corporate governance models, and there is some reference to existing moral 
agreements and disagreements, the paper does not seek to either explain or predict corporate 
governance practices. The central question is whether or not corporate governance 
convergence should occur, and the analysis is primarily normative. It is also worth noting 
that, as corporate governance convergence typically operates at a national or supranational 
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level, this paper addresses the moral aspects at the ‘macro’ level of economic systems. Moral 
aspects at ‘meso’ and ‘micro’ levels are addressed in so far as they illustrate ‘macro’ level 
aspects, and within the research agenda (specifically the section on Descriptive moral 
relativism)2. 
It is not possible, within the confines of this paper, to provide any detailed explanation of 
the dominant corporate governance models. The paper follows the consensus (explained in 
detail by Clark (2007), Rossouw and Sison (2006), Solomon and Solomon (2004) amongst 
others) that the dominant corporate governance models are the Anglo-American model, with 
a shareholder orientation and financed by outsiders, and the Continental European / Japanese 
models, characterised by more of a stakeholder orientation and insider financing. These are 
undoubtedly gross simplifications, and the authors noted above provide more detail on 
individual regional and national differences.  
CONVERGENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
As noted by Clarke (2004, 205) above, convergence towards the Anglo-American model 
can be considered the principal corporate governance question. Hansmann and Kraakman’s 
(2001) The End of History for Corporate Law presented an argument that not only advocated 
convergence towards the Anglo-American model, but asserted that such convergence has 
already occurred and that the shareholder model proves superior to its alternatives. Despite 
their insistence, a number of counterarguments can be raised which refer, for example, to 
specific failures of Anglo-American corporate governance, the successes of companies within 
stakeholder, insider oriented systems and economic growth in non-Anglo-American regions. 
In addition, so-called ‘institutional complementarities’, referring to the wider elements of 
socio-economic systems, need to be considered when adopting elements of different 
corporate governance models (Clark, 2007, 259; Gordon and Roe, 2004, 6). Jacoby (2002, 
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20) notes that it would be difficult to transfer a particular corporate governance practice from 
one context to another and expect it to function effectively. He suggests, for example, that 
introducing US-style takeover mechanisms of disciplining management in Germany or Japan 
would be  
“highly disruptive of managerial incentive and selection systems presently 
in place. Hostile takeovers also would be disruptive of relations with 
suppliers and key customers, a substantial portion of which exist on a long-
term basis” (p.21). 
Normative aspects are thus either implicitly or explicitly present in the existing academic 
debate, whether in the form of insisting on the superiority of the Anglo-American model 
(with the implication that convergence should occur), or arguing against full convergence by 
appealing to negative consequences. 
The convergence debate is, however, more complex than simply analysing trends 
towards the Anglo-American model. Thomsen (2003) argues a ‘mutual convergence 
hypothesis’ claiming that alongside convergence towards the Anglo-American model, 
corporate governance in the USA and UK has moved towards the European model in a 
number of ways. There is an acknowledgement that differences will remain for decades, 
however, and Jacoby (2002, 31) notes that just as institutional complementarities influence 
the persistence of European and Japanese models, it is extremely unlikely that Anglo-
American jurisdictions would eventually adopt a stakeholder, insider orientation. However, if 
mutual convergence is occurring it may question the supposed superiority of the Anglo-
American model and weaken the normative argument for Anglo-American convergence. 
There are also alternatives to considering the globalisation of corporate governance as 
the convergence (or persistent diversity) of legal and economic models. McDonnell (2002, 
342), for instance, suggests that the focus has been directed at efficiency, with other values 
being excluded. As an alternative, he considers both historical and future corporate 
governance scenarios with reference to efficiency, equity and participation. Efficiency refers 
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to the ability of one model to outperform another; equity refers to distributional equity (which 
can be interpreted as meaning economic equality), although other aspects of equity are 
acknowledged, such as where high remuneration is justified by high performance; and 
participation generally refers to the involvement of employees in decision-making, although 
the ability of the general population to form companies and enter the corporate arena is also 
identified as a form of participation. He also emphasises the benefits of diversity, drawing a 
comparison to the benefits of biodiversity in species: “We gain from preserving even those 
species which do not seem to add much to the world at this point, because at some point in 
the future those species may become more valuable” (2002, 382). McDonnell’s arguments 
thus both counter the normative argument for convergence based only on economic 
efficiency and suggest a normative argument for diversity. 
Other factors outside the realms of law and economics have been considered in several 
ways. Roe (2000) suggests that there are deeper social norms that underlie different 
governance structures, noting European managers who consider employee concerns even 
when not required to do so, and links this to underlying social democratic norms. Branson 
(2001) takes issue with the traditional approaches to corporate governance convergence and 
notes that most of the convergence advocates base their arguments upon observations of the 
corporate governance and economic systems of the USA, the UK, Germany and Japan, 
ignoring most other nations. He argues (2001, 325) that it is “the culture beneath law and 
economic systems that is as or more important than law or capitalism itself”, and that 
“Cultural diversity militates against convergence”.  
Licht (2001) supports this view, suggesting that culture is the “mother of all path 
dependencies” (p.149) and argues that corporate governance models worldwide should be 
mapped according to culture rather than legal system in order to give a more accurate and 
useful picture. He advocates applying the cross-cultural psychology of Hofstede (1983; 2001) 
 9
and Schwartz (1999) to comparative corporate governance. Links between Hofstede’s and 
Shwartz’s cultural value dimensions and aspects of corporate governance are postulated and a 
relationship between corporate governance laws and culture identified (Licht et al., 2005). 
This then provides support for ‘harmonising’ corporate governance structures with the 
prevailing culture in different countries. Following Hofstede’s and/or Schwartz’s cultural 
value dimensions, however, adds complexities and assumptions: the adoption of an 
underlying theory of culture and values, the ambiguous concept of ‘culture’ and the links 
between Hofstede’s and/or Schwartz’s values and corporate governance models. As Licht 
(2001, 202) notes, empirical studies test not only the links between cultural value dimensions 
and aspects of corporate governance, but the underlying theory of culture and values 
proposed by Hofstede and/or Schwartz. The results could thus be ambiguous. 
However, the idea that it is culture that gives rise to the legal structures and economic 
norms that constitute corporate governance systems, and that therefore corporate governance 
models can justifiably be expected to differ across cultures, can be linked to cultural 
relativism. In as far as this cultural relativism argues for an understanding that different 
values may be held by different groups, it implies restraint in imposing one group’s values on 
another. This concept is closely allied to the claims and arguments of moral relativism, which 
operate, however, at both individual and group (cultural / national) level.  
Although the traditional convergence debate is couched in legal and/or economic terms, 
the discussion above illustrates how the work of some theorists, such as Licht, Branson, Roe 
and McDonnell, suggests that beneath the legal and economic structures of corporate 
governance lies a more basic set of values, attitudes and/or beliefs. This coincides with the 
statement of United States Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren, that “the law floats on a sea 
of ethics” (quoted in Preston (2007, 21)). An understanding of this underlying morality can 
accordingly provide insight into ‘appropriate’ corporate governance structures. 
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THE MORALITY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
This section identifies a range of moral principles and philosophies that can most readily 
be identified with the most prominent corporate governance models, beginning with the 
Anglo-American model, followed by the Continental European and Japanese models, and 
closing with some practical examples. These models are chosen as they are widely known 
and understood and they typically have an impact in other regions as well. In particular, the 
relevance that these models have for emerging markets and developing countries should be 
noted, both as examples and as competing (and conflicting) alternatives. Millar et al. (2005), 
for instance, identify emerging markets as a separate business system and advocate a more 
holistic approach that combines different aspects; regarding developing countries, Reed 
(2002) emphasises the pressures placed by socio-economic developmental goals on corporate 
governance reforms. As Judge & Naoumova (2004, 302) note with reference to Russia, many 
nations are “at a crossroads” with regard to their corporate governance developments. 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate how the morality underlying the two dominant 
corporate governance models can differ. An appreciation of these differences in turn suggests 
the consideration of moral relativism3.  
 
The Anglo-American model 
Collier and Roberts (2001, 68) approach the morality of the Anglo-American model as 
follows:  
“Within the agency view of governance there is in principle no ethics and 
hence no ethical problem. Instead we are confronted with an atomized self-
seeking individual, who must be closely watched and can only be 
frightened or incentivized into taking account of the interests of others. The 
only ethical imperative at work here is a Friedmanesque dictum to pursue 
profit maximization.”  
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This approach refers to the view of human behaviour upon which agency theory is based: 
that of the rational individual, who, given competing choices, will always choose that which 
optimises his/her economic benefits. Such a view does not permit altruism or selflessness, 
and if morality necessarily involves a consideration of the ‘good’, the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ 
(see Rossouw and Van Vuuren, 2004), then indeed there would not seem to be room for any 
morals. The Anglo-American model, as an extension of this view by virtue of its basis in 
agency theory, and which expressly limits consideration of the interests of stakeholders other 
than shareholders, can then be thought of as having ‘in principle no ethics’. 
However, despite the assumption of self-interested behaviour, it does not necessarily 
follow that the Anglo-American model has no connection with the human ‘good’. There 
could, for example, be ‘good’ consequences of such a system, the system could be instituted 
with ‘good’ intentions and imbued with ‘good’ principles (such as fairness and honesty), and 
there could be ancillary moral aspects (such as the achievement of individual freedom and/or 
self-fulfilment). Limited corporate responsibility and accountability does not necessarily 
render the model either immoral or amoral. 
 
Utilitarianism 
Consequentialism as a moral philosophy identifies moral worth with actions that 
generate the best consequences.  Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism that specifically 
refers to generating the greatest good where this takes the form of happiness or well-being. 
Probably the strongest moral justification for the ‘Friedmanesque’ profit maximisation is 
along such utilitarian principles, by appealing to the positive overall consequences that are 
associated with an economic model in which shareholder interests are paramount (and not 
affected by the demands of other stakeholders) and there is minimal government intervention.  
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Coelho et al. (2003) provide a useful hypothetical example of mousetrap production to 
show how the public interest is best served through open markets and the prioritisation of 
shareholder wealth. They consider how competition in the marketplace aims to entice 
consumers through three legal means: “(1) by offering better ‘mousetraps’ at attractive prices; 
(2) by offering equivalent ‘mousetraps’ at lower prices or more conveniently; (3) by offering 
products that substitute for ‘mousetraps’” (p.17). The authors then argue that “customers 
benefit through either better traps, less expensive traps, or trap substitutes … suppliers of 
mice control products benefit because they have higher incomes than they would have had 
otherwise … even people who are not bothered by mice benefit from improved mice control” 
(p.17), the last group benefiting from general improvements in public health and in more 
efficient allocation of resources. The example concludes as follows: 
“if we accept the notion that serving the public interest is the sine qua non 
of social responsibility, then it follows logically that legal profit seeking 
(with neither fraud nor deception) is socially responsible. Consequently, 
ethical corporate agents are being socially responsible in their efforts to 
fulfill their fiduciary obligations to the shareholders” (p.17).  
In as far as improved economic efficiency through competition and increased aggregate 
wealth serve the public interest and reflect the socially desirable ‘good life’, and to the extent 
that the Anglo-American model, through the dominant position of the market, the primacy of 
shareholder wealth and the limited role of other stakeholders, achieves this, the model can 
claim to achieve the greatest good. Moral support for this approach can accordingly be 
provided along utilitarian grounds. Referring to the development of the limited liability 
company, Tricker (1990, 253) indeed suggests that “only the invention of the wheel, it might 
be argued, has added more to the development of human well-being”. 
 
Other moral aspects 
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As seen in the Coelho et al. example above, the primacy of shareholder interests can also 
be linked to the fiduciary duties of directors. Although legally this duty may actually be to the 
corporation itself, the existence of a special, moral, duty to shareholders can be supported by 
the observation that unlike stakeholders such as employees, suppliers and customers, the 
interests of shareholders are not explicitly guaranteed through any contract. To avoid 
exploitation of this group a special duty to prioritise the interests of shareholders is necessary.  
Another moral aspect of the model can be identified in its political context. Historically, 
the USA and the UK have emphasised individual freedom, and have limited the degree to 
which the state can and should interfere in the lives of individuals. The preservation of 
individual freedom is considered to have high moral value, and the state is accordingly 
concerned largely with preserving individual freedom, and in creating conditions in which 
this freedom can flourish. These political views can be traced through some of the ‘Founding 
fathers’ of the USA (particularly Thomas Jefferson and James Madison) to the social contract 
theory and limited role of government advocated by John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. The 
‘enabling’ corporate reforms of the mid-nineteenth century can then be seen as an example of 
how the state has played its role of facilitating the expression of individual freedom.  
A moral defence of the individualism of the rational economic man that lies at the heart 
of agency theory can also be found in notions of self-fulfilment, self-realisation and 
authenticity. Humanistic and Existentialist psychologies and philosophies, from Carl Rogers 
to Abraham Maslow and Jean-Paul Sartre, all emphasise the individual and his/her 
development (See The Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology and Behavioral Science, 2001; 
Sartre, 1946). Charles Taylor (1991) also argues for an individualistic ‘ethic of authenticity’, 
and regards the self-centred aspects of individualism in Western culture as “deviant and 
trivialized modes” of the ideal of authenticity (p.55). He calls instead for a “work of retrieval, 
that we identify and articulate the higher ideal behind the more or less debased practices” 
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(p.72) and claims that “like other facets of modern individualism … authenticity points us 
towards a more self-responsible form of life” (p.74). Prima facie judgements of the Anglo-
American model as immoral, by associating it with the “malaises” (Taylor, 1991, 1) of 
modern Western individualistic culture may therefore be premature. 
Furthermore, much of the focus in recent corporate governance reforms is on making 
management accountable to the shareholders; this can be linked to moral virtues of fairness, 
honesty and transparency. Maitland identifies a number of moral aspects to free-market 
economics, including the morality of self-interest (2002), communitarian morality (1998), 
moral virtues in the market (1997), the right to self-determination (1994) and the right to free 
voluntary contracting (1989). The last two of these draw specifically on the notions of the 
corporation as a nexus of contracts and efficient voluntary contracting that underlie Anglo-
American corporate governance. Finally, the apparent immorality of the prioritisation of 
shareholders, to the neglect of other stakeholders, can be mitigated when one considers the 
possibility that shareholder wealth can be increased through greater attention being paid to 
customers and employees (instrumental stakeholder theory, see Donaldson and Preston 
(1995)), and the fact that social concerns are increasingly addressed through powerful 
institutional investors (Verstegen Ryan, 2005, 59). 
The Continental European and Japanese models 
The morality of corporate governance in Continental Europe and Japan is perhaps more 
directly evident than that of the Anglo-American approach. The formal inclusion of 
stakeholder groups such as employees and creditors in the system of corporate governance 
through the supervisory board can be considered to have moral value. Theoretically, at least, 
it should be more difficult for employees and creditors to suffer at the expense of 
shareholders’ interests. As the dominant shareholders have direct access to management, the 
agency problem that is such an issue in the Anglo-American model should also be alleviated 
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and accountability and transparency of executive management should be facilitated. While 
these moral advantages may hold for significant shareholders and those with direct 
representation, minority shareholders without such involvement could be exploited. Demise 
(2005, 216) also notes that problems of death from overwork (karoshi) and harassment of 
employees persist in Japanese companies, which suggests that the moral benefits of an 
employee orientation are not clear cut. 
 
Deontological morality 
Deontological morality refers to duties or obligations, in which consequences are 
considered morally irrelevant. One version of this can be found in Immanuel Kant’s 
imperative that people should never be treated as a means to an end only (See Johnson, 
2004). The strongest moral argument for the Continental European and Japanese models runs 
along these lines, emphasising their incorporation of stakeholder interests and ascribing 
intrinsic moral worth to the ‘stakes’ of various stakeholder groups.  
Evan and Freeman (1993) consider the various types of ‘investments’ that different 
stakeholder groups make in the corporation (both financial and non-financial) and the ways in 
which all stakeholders are affected by the corporation and each other. Although working from 
an Anglo-American perspective, their proposal is a wholesale reinterpretation of the 
corporation along the lines of the Kantian deontological morality. They consider traditional 
managerial capitalism to give insufficient weight to stakeholder interests, and identify legal 
and economic areas in which the shareholder approach has already come under attack and 
been compromised. Their reinterpretation requires that the interests of stakeholder groups are 
included as ends in themselves rather than as a means to increased shareholder wealth. This 
further entails redefining the purpose of the corporation as a “vehicle for coordinating 
stakeholder interests” (1993, 82), and the authors envisage the introduction of stakeholder 
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representation at board level and changes to corporate law in order to bring this into practice. 
The corporate governance models of Continental Europe and Japan already incorporate the 
active involvement of stakeholders other than shareholders, to varying extents, and can 
therefore be supported by such a deontological morality. 
 
Other moral aspects 
Donaldson and Preston (1995, 85) similarly consider the ‘stake’ of the various 
stakeholder groups to represent a moral interest, but justify this with reference to property 
rights and distributive justice, in its “modern and pluralistic form” (p.88) rather than Kantian 
deontology. This acknowledges various characteristics of distributive justice, such as “need, 
ability, effort, and mutual agreement” (p.84) and observes that the stakeholder conception of 
the corporation gives form to these potentially competing aspects of distributive justice (such 
as where employee interests may be worthy of consideration based on their long-term effort, 
whereas the interests of members of the local community may be warranted based on their 
need (p.84)). Again, this provides a moral basis for corporate governance in Continental 
Europe and Japan to the extent that the interests of various stakeholders are actively taken 
into consideration, rather than leaving them as a function of the market.  
A case can also be made in which moral support is gained by appeal to utilitarianism. 
The economic successes of Germany and Japan can arguably be linked to their stakeholder, 
insider approach to corporate governance. Clarke (2007, 183) notes that the German 
economic success involved “[investing] in high quality production with a highly skilled 
workforce. Companies substantially invested in their employees and offered security of 
employment, and workers reciprocated with commitment and ingenuity”. Siebert (2004, 41) 
considers the German approach to be well oriented to incremental improvements in 
established industries such as the automobile industry, but “deficient in leapfrogging to new 
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approaches and new products” when compared to the USA. Similarly, recent developments 
which suggest a move towards the Anglo-American corporate governance model in Japan 
have raised the question whether “Japan can continue with its unrivalled manufacturing 
expertise and commitment to innovation and research and development” within this new 
framework (Clarke, 2007, 214). Although, as discussed earlier, the Anglo-American model 
may have moral support by appealing to utilitarianism, the insider, stakeholder model could 
thus claim to achieve the greatest good in so far as happiness and well-being is associated 
with increased loyalty, commitment, security and/or innovation and development of high 
quality products. 
Some practical considerations 
Although the discussion thus far has been theoretical, a brief consideration of how these 
different moralities play out in practice is relevant.  
Enron’s rise was on the back of deregulation in the energy industry, and the belief that 
profits could be reaped within the new market for energy contracts and without government 
intervention. Enron’s fall, however, demonstrated how the relentless pursuit of shareholder 
wealth, combined with the malfunctioning safeguards of independent directors and external 
auditors, could in fact compromise the fiduciary duty of directors to their shareholders. 
Sherron Watkins, the whistleblower, notes speculation that “the top executives at Enron 
either had culpability in the accounting shenanigans themselves or chose to ignore them 
because they did not want the gravy train of money coming to them (in the form of bonuses 
and stock option sales) to stop” (Watkins, 2003, 10) - a textbook case of the agency problem. 
Just as interesting as the circumstances of the Enron fraud is the ensuing reaction. 
Watkins (2003, 9) observes (and disagrees with) the “commentators [that] initially argued 
that the capitalist system worked. That the marketplace caught Enron in the act of presenting 
less than honest financial results and punished the company.” The introduction of the 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 can be seen as an attempt to reduce the agency problem by 
addressing the conflicts of interests exhibited in the auditing profession and re-enforcing the 
fiduciary duty of directors to report honestly to shareholders. In this sense the morality 
underlying the Anglo-American model has not changed and the Enron saga can be seen to 
have revealed a weakness in a system that otherwise operates well, providing the greatest 
good for the greatest number. Reforms are thus designed to address the weakness without 
impinging too much on the functioning of the system. (Clarke, however, notes how some 
have overlooked “the role Enron played in the exploitation of developing countries, 
consumers and employees” (Clarke, 2007, 328).)  
Parmalat’s failure is the story of the disgrace of the Tanzi family, a dominant controlling 
shareholder that brought the company to ruin. The accounting manipulations that arose were 
to hide the failures of the family’s aggressive acquisitions policy around the world. The 
exploitation by a dominant shareholder is a principal weakness of the Continental European 
model and Parmalat presents a prime example of this weakness. The relationship system that 
should have encouraged transparency failed, and it is ironic that it was the Bank of America 
that exposed the fraudulent EUR 5 billion bank account. The reaction to the Parmalat fraud 
has included the requirement that minority shareholders elect at least one director and 
member of the board of auditors (Enriques & Volpin, 2007, 130).  
This is not to say that corporate governance failures necessarily follow these patterns in 
Anglo-American or European countries, there are too many differences between companies 
and the theoretical discussion above has been limited to traditional extremes. In a similar 
vein, however, the morality underlying corporate governance can be observed in currently 
successful companies. Although specific references to corporate governance in annual reports 
typically focus on Board issues, there are other aspects of these reports which imply the wider 
view of corporate governance. Siemens, for example, incorporated in Germany, begins its 
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2007 Annual Report with a letter from the supervisory board, 50% of which are employee 
representatives. The letter explains how the supervisory board has advised management, been 
informed of significant executive decisions throughout the year and has approved the annual 
financial statements. The prime position of this letter in the report emphasises the importance 
attached to this involvement by employees.  
Other jurisdictions can yield other insights. The South African retailer Pick ‘n Pay begins 
its 2007 Annual Report with a list of the company’s stakeholders, alphabetically (suggesting 
that there is no priority) listing Communities, Customers, Employees, Shareholders and 
Suppliers. This is followed by a group Value-added statement, an accounting report that is 
little used outside of South Africa (Van Staden, 2003) but which can be seen to emphasise the 
organisation’s economic sustainability rather than a bottom-line profit figure or a return to 
shareholders. 
Having identified the ‘sea of ethics’ that underlies the prominent models of corporate 
governance, it is apparent that simple denunciations of any model as either immoral or 
amoral are misplaced. It is also clear, however, that while corporate governance works to the 
betterment of society, judgements vary regarding exactly what this means, and consequently 
how it can be achieved4. In the light of these differences in moral judgements, the claims and 
arguments of moral relativism become relevant. The following section examines these claims 
and arguments in detail. 
MORAL RELATIVISM 
Simply put, moral relativism is that aspect of philosophy that deals with differences in 
moral judgements, questioning whether they reflect absolute or universal moral truths. This 
section introduces the topic, applies it to corporate governance convergence, and then 
considers some of its common criticisms.  
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Although it did not become a prominent topic until the twentieth century (Gowans, 
2004), the problem of moral relativism is considered central to moral philosophy (Holmes, 
1993, 17). Gowans (2004) describes the three aspects of moral relativism as follows5: 
Descriptive moral relativism: As a matter of empirical fact, there are deep 
and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these 
disagreements are much more significant than whatever agreements there 
may be. 
Metaethical moral relativism: The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or 
their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the 
traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons. 
Normative moral relativism: We should not interfere with the actions of 
persons that are based on moral judgments we reject, when the 
disagreement is not or cannot be rationally resolved. 
The claim of Descriptive moral relativism is entirely empirical, although it is important 
to note that the moral disagreements refer to genuine differences in moral judgements and not 
differences of fact or of convention6. In contrast, Metaethical and Normative moral relativism 
are philosophical claims. There are clear connections between these three types of moral 
relativism, summarised as follows (Gowans, 2004): Empirical support for Descriptive moral 
relativism is not sufficient to justify Metaethical moral relativism; Empirical support for 
Descriptive moral relativism is, however, necessary to justify Metaethical moral relativism 
(at least in its most common forms); and Normative moral relativism is implied by the 
support for Descriptive moral relativism and Metaethical moral relativism7. 
The path from Descriptive, through Metaethical, to Normative moral relativism cannot 
be established as logically necessary. If it is established that there are significant moral 
disagreements concerning certain issues, it does not necessarily follow that there is no 
absolute or universal moral truth on these issues. Similarly, if it is established that there is no 
absolute or universal moral truth on an issue, it does not necessarily mean that we should 
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refrain from interfering with the actions of those that express moral judgements that differ 
from our own. 
 
Application to corporate governance 
Regarding the corporate governance convergence debate, the claims can be reformulated 
as follows:  
Descriptive moral relativism: There is moral disagreement with regard to the 
relationship between corporations and society, including the objectives and obligations 
of corporations, and as expressed in differing models of corporate governance. 
Metaethical moral relativism: There is no absolute or universal moral truth regarding 
the relationship between corporations and society. That is, differing models of corporate 
governance can claim to be morally right. 
Normative moral relativism: Implied by the above, it is morally wrong to impose a 
model of corporate governance on a society that maintains widespread moral 
disagreement with the values underlying that model. This would also apply to 
interference with another society’s corporate governance model. This is subject to the 
disagreement being unable to be rationally resolved8. 
A number of important relationships can be identified from these claims. If Descriptive 
and Metaethical moral relativism can be justified, then Normative moral relativism is 
significantly strengthened. Similarly, if either Descriptive or Metaethical moral relativism 
cannot be justified, then Normative moral relativism is significantly weakened. If Descriptive 
moral relativism cannot be justified, this not only weakens Normative moral relativism, but 
renders it redundant, and lastly, if Descriptive moral relativism can be justified, but 
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Metaethical moral relativism cannot, the claim that one can interfere in the actions of those 
that are based on differing moral judgements may still be justified.  
These claims and relationships provide a theoretical structure through which the 
normative question of whether or not corporate governance models should converge can be 
analysed. It should be noted that the three aspects of moral relativism are presented as claims 
that may or may not be justified, and not as faits accomplis. Discussion of moral relativism 
and corporate governance convergence does not preclude the possibility of an underlying 
universal morality; the purpose here is to provide a structure through which this can be 
studied. Before a more detailed research agenda is presented, however, some potential 
criticisms need to be addressed. 
Criticisms 
In some quarters, mention of moral relativism is immediately discounted, for reasons that 
range from problems of contradiction to resolute beliefs in universal or absolute morality. For 
this concept to be taken seriously, therefore, the criticisms that have been raised (see 
Rossouw and Van Vuuren, 2004, 91-92; Williams, 1972) require detailed consideration.  
A first major criticism is that there is a contradiction inherent in the argument for 
Normative moral relativism: the prescription that one should not interfere with the actions of 
those with different moral judgements is intended to be a universal moral principle, but is 
premised on Metaethical moral relativism that insists that there are no universal moral 
principles.  Wong (1993) argues that Normative moral relativism is not a universal moral 
principle, but is nevertheless binding in Western societies that, through an implicit social 
contract, subscribe to a value of tolerance. (There is no reason why this value of tolerance 
should not be considered equally important in some non-Western societies.) Even without 
Wong’s contribution, the contradiction is avoided in the application of moral relativism to 
corporate governance convergence as the Metaethical position does not claim that there are 
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no universal moral principles, only that there is no universally morally superior corporate 
governance. It is possible to maintain that there are universal moral principles in certain 
areas, but not in the area of corporate governance.  
A second criticism of Normative moral relativism is that it stifles debate. Implied by the 
acceptance of Metaethical moral relativism is not only the normative prescription that one 
should not interfere with the actions of those with different moral judgements, but also that 
one should not consider and debate the merits of conflicting moral judgements (Williams 
(1972, 40) notes that “it is possible for someone persuaded of subjectivist views to cease to 
care about moral issues”).  This lack of debate can be seen to negate, or at least hinder the 
possibilities of finding solutions to moral problems. Similarly, a lack of debate and an 
acceptance of different moral judgements could result in the acceptance of tyrannical 
practices (however defined), and a rigid adherence to the status quo (particularly where a 
group’s morality is determined by reference to the majority, see Levy (2002, 80)). 
There are however, a number of aspects in which debate need not be stifled, and where 
considerations of moral relativism may in fact provide further insights. Firstly, regarding 
social or cultural moral relativism, the morality that is characteristic of a particular society or 
culture can never be considered ‘finalised’, and is consequently open to debate and analysis. 
Secondly, regarding the application of moral relativism to corporate governance where the 
existence of universal moral principles is accepted, debate over whether or not the moral 
principles underlying corporate governance fall within this set of universal moral principles 
must surely follow. Thirdly, if tolerance is accepted as a highly valued moral principle, then, 
when faced with different moral judgements in differing circumstances, one must consider 
the extent to which the principle of tolerance is binding9. Lastly, to the extent that moral 
judgements are based upon facts (such as in a consideration of the consequences of an 
action), assessments of these moral judgements are contingent upon the truth of these facts; 
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the prescriptions of Normative moral relativism are therefore open to continual assessment as 
these facts, and the interpretation of these facts, change.  
RESEARCH AGENDA 
As indicated above, the claims and arguments of moral relativism provide a structure 
through which the morality of corporate governance convergence can be analysed and 
studied. While this is relevant for developed countries where there are ongoing questions of 
convergence, this is particularly useful for developing countries, especially those that have 
inherited corporate structures through colonialism, and that are currently engaged in 
developing ‘appropriate’ national institutions, while facing an immediate need for greater 
economic development. Within these nations there can be pressure to adopt Anglo-American 
practices in order to encourage international investment, as well as to develop local 
institutions that reflect their national and/or cultural identity.  
This section presents possibilities for research on the three aspects of moral relativism 
discussed above. 
Descriptive moral relativism  
The question raised by Descriptive moral relativism is whether or not there are moral 
disagreements regarding the relationship between corporations and society. This is empirical 
in nature, the purpose of research being to provide evidence of moral agreement or 
disagreement. The general theoretical proposition from the claim of Descriptive moral 
relativism is that members of two different groups maintain moral disagreements with regard 
to the relationship between corporations and society, including the objectives and obligations 
of corporations. In the context of international convergence these groups would typically 
represent individuals from different countries or regions, but there may also be cases where 
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moral differences within a society may be informative, particularly in countries with 
significant diversity such as South Africa or Malaysia, and given the increasingly 
multicultural nature of many developed nations.  
This section proposes specific moral judgements that relate to different corporate 
governance models, where moral disagreement could be expected across certain groups, and 
from which more specific propositions can be formulated. Several different possible sources 
of data and research methods are then considered.  
 
Moral judgements and propositions 
To a considerable extent, part of the moral difference between the principal corporate 
governance models can be expressed in terms of how far and to whom corporate governance 
‘virtues’ are considered to apply to the various stakeholders of corporations. In this regard, 
the fundamental corporate governance principles of fairness, accountability, transparency and 
responsibility, as presented to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in the 1998 Millstein report present useful ‘virtues’. The principles of fairness, 
accountability, transparency and responsibility can be formulated as follows10: 
 
Fairness: Corporate dealings reflect contractual relationships and recognise the moral 
rights of the relevant parties; 
Accountability: Control mechanisms monitor the activities of management and ensure 
that they coincide with the interests of the relevant parties; 
Transparency: Corporate activities are disclosed accurately, completely and timeously to 
the relevant parties;  
Responsibility: Corporations actively consider the interests of the relevant parties in their 
decision making and planning. 
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 Differences can be expected regarding (1) the stakeholders to whom a corporation is 
considered obliged to extend these corporate governance virtues (the relevant parties), and (2) 
the degree of such obligations. These are differences in moral judgements which then have a 
direct relationship to corporate governance structures. 
It is not possible here to formulate theoretical propositions for all jurisdictions across 
these principles and individual researchers will identify specific areas of potential moral 
disagreement that depend on the jurisdictions under investigation. For illustrative purposes, 
however, the theoretical difference in corporate governance models between the UK and 
Continental Europe could lead to the proposition: Regarding the stakeholders to whom 
corporations have responsibility, Dutch businesspeople identify more stakeholders than their 
British counterparts. Similarly, apparent differences between American and German 
corporate governance could suggest that: Regarding the moral rights of employees (fairness), 
the beliefs of German managers reflect greater employee entitlements than the beliefs of 
American managers. A consideration of ‘traditional African values’ could lead one to 
propose that: Regarding the reporting obligations of corporations, Southern African 
accountants believe that corporations should be equally transparent to all stakeholders (in 
this case a comparison could be drawn to Anglo-American orthodoxy).  
Differences in the perceived importance of different ‘types’ of corporate success may 
also reflect differences in moral judgement that could be linked to aspects of corporate 
governance. McDonnell’s (2002) categories of efficiency, equity and participation can be 
considered useful here as they can be related to corporate governance issues such as 
executive remuneration and employee board representation. It is conceivable, for instance, 
that some people could consider the achievement of efficiency to be a greater moral good 
than the achievement of employee participation, and one could then envisage a corporate 
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governance model without mandatory board representation for employees. Although 
McDonnell’s categories can be interpreted in several different ways, differences in moral 
judgements may be highlighted by restating these categories as: ‘economic efficiency’, 
referring to optimum allocation of resources and the achievement of financial and operational 
performance targets, ‘distributional equity’, referring to the level of economic inequality 
between executive management and certain other stakeholders (particularly employees and 
the community), and ‘stakeholder participation’, referring to the degree of involvement of 
various stakeholders in corporate decision making and including concepts of corporate 
citizenship. Differences in moral judgements relating to the relative importance of these types 
of corporate success may suggest different corporate governance characteristics. Along these 
lines, a theoretical proposition could state that: Regarding the importance of reducing 
economic inequality, Scandinavians consider this to be of greater moral benefit than their 
American counterparts.  
These two key areas of differences in moral judgement are portrayed in figure 1. Note 
also that these are not intended to be exhaustive and the analysis has drawn primarily on the 
discussion of the Anglo-American and Continental European / Japanese corporate 
governance models. Further investigation and the identification of moral principles in other 
jurisdictions (particularly emerging markets and developing counties) may reveal additional, 
relevant, moral judgements. 
[FIGURE 1] 
 
Sources and methods 
In the discussion on corporate governance convergence, the debate typically takes place 
at the national level. One approach would thus be to survey members of two societies on the 
moral judgements identified above. Suitable respondent groups would need to be 
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homogeneous as far as possible in all respects other than nationality. Members of a 
profession such as accounting could represent one such group, as they would be expected to 
have similar backgrounds in education and work experience, and there are usually established 
professional bodies in both developed and developing countries. Other groups could include 
the employees of multi-national enterprises, and student groups studying the same course in 
different countries. There is no reason to limit the respondents to businesspeople, as long as 
the survey instrument is designed appropriately.  
Identifying moral agreement and disagreement is not a simple task, and a variety of 
research methods could be used. This could include quantitative questionnaires asking 
respondents for their beliefs related to specific theoretical propositions (either directly, or 
through the use of case studies), or an index that measures beliefs regarding corporate moral 
obligations to certain stakeholder groups. Qualitative research can explore how respondents 
in different groups approach or have dealt with certain moral issues, or explore how a 
particular group perceives the moral obligations and objectives of corporations. This could, 
for example, include interviewing managers from different groups, probing their beliefs and 
experience on different corporate objectives. 
Directly approaching individuals is not the only method, however, and Brandt notes that 
evidence for Descriptive moral relativism can be obtained by considering what is “praised, 
condemned or prohibited in various societies” (cited in Axinn et al., 2004). In this regard, 
reviews and content analyses of corporate publications, the business media, local corporate 
governance reports, codes of ethics and corporate citizenship initiatives from different 
jurisdictions could provide indications of the moral judgements implicit in those societies, 
and, by implication, the extent of moral agreement or disagreement. 
This research can be distinguished from other comparative, cross-cultural studies by its 
emphasis on specific moral judgements. In all cases, care is necessary to ensure that any 
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differences can be related to specific moral judgements, and are not differences in fact or of 
convention. 
Metaethical moral relativism 
The question raised by Metaethical moral relativism is whether or not there is an 
absolute or universal moral truth regarding the relationship between corporations and society. 
The existence of different moral judgements, and the ability to justify these differences does 
not itself mean that there is no absolute or universal moral truth on a matter. It is possible to 
evaluate different moral arguments, to weigh their strength, and it is conceivable that a 
universal moral truth regarding the relationship between corporations and society can be 
advanced. The question is largely philosophical and it is the work of business ethicists to 
bring the wide range of moral philosophies and arguments to bear on this issue. A number of 
more specific research questions can be identified, including: What exactly does universal 
moral truth regarding the relationship between corporations and society entail? How could 
such universal moral truth be demonstrated? Is it possible to identify certain moral 
‘successes’ which could justify a model’s claim to moral superiority? Which moral 
philosophies provide the most persuasive arguments? In what way should competing moral 
arguments be evaluated on this question? 
By viewing this specifically in terms of the claim of Metaethical moral relativism, 
confusion of the issue with actual moral disagreements (the subject of Descriptive moral 
relativism) and/or with the call for tolerance (the outcome of Normative moral relativism) can 
be avoided. 
Normative moral relativism 
The question raised by Normative moral relativism is whether or not it is morally wrong 
to impose a model of corporate governance on a society that maintains widespread moral 
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disagreement with the values underlying that model. Given the relationships between the 
three aspects of moral relativism discussed earlier, evidence and arguments put forward for 
both Descriptive and Metaethical moral relativism have a direct impact on the argument for 
Normative moral relativism. The analysis at this point consists of weighing the strength of the 
evidence and arguments put forward, and although the normative argument can never be 
conclusive, this does not preclude it being persuasive.  
Note that the claims of moral relativism do not of themselves suggest that corporate 
governance convergence either should or should not occur. They provide a structure through 
which the normative claim can be evaluated or proposed, once investigations relating to the 
descriptive and/or metaethical claims have been conducted. The structure can also be used to 
evaluate existing normative claims. As an example, existing calls opposing convergence 
(Normative moral relativism) that are premised (either explicitly or implicitly) on there not 
being any corporate governance model that is universally morally justified (Metaethical 
moral relativism) can be largely dismissed if there is evidence of significant moral agreement 
across the jurisdictions concerned (Descriptive moral relativism). 
CONCLUSION 
Business and morality are not always considered to be easy bedfellows. Few would 
suggest, however, that business dealings would be possible without some modica of trust and 
honesty. Similarly, it is not unreasonable to contend that directors have certain moral 
obligations to those who provide finance, regardless of their legal requirements or the 
capability of enforcement. In turn, the corporation can be seen as a mechanism which has 
contributed significantly to the development of society in the past and has the potential to 
continue to do so, in all parts of the world. Despite differences in both the theoretical 
approaches and practical application of corporate governance in various jurisdictions, there is 
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to some extent a common corporate governance morality. The successful operation of 
corporations is generally considered beneficial in their provision of various socio-economic 
‘goods’. The four corporate governance ‘virtues’ of responsibility, accountability, fairness 
and transparency are accepted as characteristics of good corporate governance not only in the 
30 OECD member countries, but in many others as well.  
A closer examination of the moral principles that support the dominant Anglo-American 
and Continental European / Japanese corporate governance models reveals that various 
different moral principles are implicit. This suggests that there are differences in moral 
judgements regarding the relationship between corporations and society. Amongst other 
moral principles and philosophies, the Anglo-American model is most closely identified with 
utilitarian moral justifications, while the Continental European / Japanese models can be 
associated with deontological morality. 
This observation of moral differences underlying corporate governance models raises the 
question of whether it is morally appropriate for convergence of these models to occur. In this 
regard, the claims and arguments of moral relativism have been presented to provide a 
theoretical structure through which this question can be analysed. 
A research agenda has accordingly been proposed. Descriptive moral relativism, which 
claims that there are significant differences regarding the relationship between corporations 
and society, needs to be assessed empirically. A number of specific moral judgements have 
been proposed, that relate, firstly, to the degree to which corporations are morally obliged to 
extend the corporate governance ‘virtues’ to various stakeholders, and, secondly, to the 
perceived moral importance attached to different types of corporate success – referring 
particularly to the goals of efficiency, equity and participation. Research into the extent of 
agreement or disagreement can be carried out in various ways, including quantitative 
questionnaires, qualitative interviews and content analyses. Sources of data could include 
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relatively homogeneous groups of professionals (such as accountants), employees or students 
across different societies, as well as corporate and national publications. 
Metaethical moral relativism, claiming that there is no absolute or universal moral truth 
regarding the relationship between corporations and society, can be further subjected to 
philosophical analysis and a number of research questions have been suggested. The 
arguments and evidence that relate to both Descriptive and Metaethical moral relativism can 
then be brought to bear on the normative question of whether a corporate governance model 
that is based on different moral judgements regarding the relationship between corporations 
and society should be accepted or imposed. The structure provided by these aspects of moral 
relativism thus provides a useful framework for analysing the moral appropriateness of 
corporate governance convergence.  
Theoretically, this presents a distinct approach to the moral aspects of corporate 
governance and the convergence debate. The values that underlie corporate governance 
models become the centre of attention, displacing the usual legal and economic issues. At the 
same time, the identification and consideration of moral judgements avoids the somewhat 
difficult concept of ‘culture’, and allows for a more direct assessment of moral difference. 
In terms of practice, the question of whether convergence between two jurisdictions is 
morally appropriate has significant implications. If answered in the positive it calls for a 
sharing of policy and resources; if answered in the negative, differences can be highlighted 
that suggest the development or reform of corporate governance structures in ways that may 
ultimately prove more successful in the jurisdictions concerned. In both cases, the broader 
corporate governance arena is involved, including not only corporate law and governance 
regulations, but accounting practice, approaches to managing organisations and their 
relationships with stakeholders and even business education. In some countries, where the 
adoption of Western structures is of some concern this structured approach to the moral 
 33
aspects of the convergence debate can also assist in reducing unsubstantiated conjecture 
about which practices are considered morally appropriate or inappropriate, and thereby allow 
the confident development of corporate governance structures that can ultimately enhance 
societal well-being.  
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ENDNOTES 
1 There is some overlap between theories of corporate governance and theories of CSR, and 
both traditionally present shareholder and stakeholder theories in opposition (see Letza et al. 
(2004) and Melé (2008)). This paper refers primarily to corporate governance as this 
encompasses not only managerial approaches to CSR, but a range of issues that fall within 
broader legal and economic frameworks (that would extend to other aspects such as reporting 
practices, board composition and oversight mechanisms). 
Accordingly, while CSR is considered to be an aspect of corporate governance 
systems, this paper is concerned with the morality that underlies different corporate 
governance systems. To illustrate, McWilliams & Siegel (2001, 117) define CSR as “actions 
that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is 
required by law”. Within the CSR literature there is no attempt to define what is meant by 
‘some social good’ or to question whether this is the same across various jurisdictions; going 
beyond that required by the law can also clearly differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
Instead, this paper identifies the morality underlying the dominant corporate governance 
models so that the claims and arguments of moral relativism can provide a framework 
through which the question of convergence can be analysed. 
 
2 See Rossouw & Van Vuuren (2004) for a more detailed discussion of ‘macro’, ‘meso’ and 
‘micro’ levels of analysis in business ethics. 
3 There is no intention to cover the moral principles that underlie all systems of corporate 
governance, and it is acknowledged that other jurisdictions, particularly emerging markets 
and developing countries, could contribute additional moral principles. The purpose of this 
section is to illustrate differences in the morality underlying corporate governance that leads 
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to a consideration of moral relativism. The identification of other moral principles is an area 
of further research. 
4 Maitland’s (1994) article is worth noting at this point. He argues that the difference between 
the shareholder and stakeholder views of the corporation is empirical rather than normative, 
and that there is in fact moral agreement between the models. This is based on his view that 
the morality of both models lies in their affirmation of the self-determination of stakeholders, 
and interpreting the corporation as a nexus of contracts. This, however, ignores the other 
moral principles that apply and can be brought to bear on the wider relationship between 
corporations and society. 
5 Although Gowans refers to differences between societies and groups, these claims can 
equally refer to differences between individuals. 
6 Levy (2002) gives examples of apparent moral disagreements (such as live burial amongst 
the Dinka) that reflect different beliefs concerning certain facts or occurrences rather than 
different moral judgements. Similarly, some differences, such as the side of the road on 
which one is permitted to drive, are really differences in convention rather than differences in 
moral judgement. 
7 Gowans (2004) states that Normative moral relativism should not be considered as a ‘form’ 
of moral relativism, but rather as a thesis implied by the other two forms. 
8 There is no single method that prescribes how moral disagreements can be rationally 
resolved. An assessment of the nature and the extent of the disagreements is, however, likely 
to provide some indication of their possible resolution. 
9 Wong (1993:449) notes that when faced with Metaethical moral relativism,  
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“we must strive to find what will be for us the right or the best thing to do, 
and also deal with the feelings of unease caused by the recognition that 
there is no single right or best thing to do. This task, no matter how 
difficult, is not the end of moral reflection. It instead may be the beginning 
of a different sort of reflection that involves on the one hand an effort to 
reach an understanding with those who have substantially different values, 
and on the other the effort to stay true to one’s own values.” 
 
10 These formulations are adapted from the descriptions provided in the Millstein report (see 
OECD, 1999), in which the parties involved are more specifically identified. These 
formulations are more general as the parties to whom these ‘virtues’ apply is the object of 
investigation. 
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FIGURE 1 
Moral judgements relating to corporate governance 
 
 
 
*These categories of stakeholders are the same as those suggested by Evan and Freeman 
(1993), with the exception of ‘management’ and the ‘wider community’. As management and 
the directors are the moral agents of the corporation, there is little use in considering the 
moral obligations that they have to themselves and this category has been omitted. The 
‘wider community’ has been added as this corresponds closely with the role of corporations 
in society as a whole, a relevant issue when considering corporate governance systems that 
are applicable to entire nations. See also Aguilera and Jackson (2003) for an alternative 
conception of stakeholder interactions, with specific reference to corporate governance 
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models and their international convergence. 
 
